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Antitakeover provisions, managerial entrenchment and firm innovation

  • University of Massachusetts Boston
  • Western University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We explore the relation between antitakeover provisions (i.e. managerial entrenchment) and firm performance in innovation. Empirical results indicate that an increase in antitakeover provisions is negatively related to number of patents and number of citations to patents. Thus managers who are protected from takeover market perform worse on innovation. However, the negative relation between antitakeover provisions and firm innovation holds only for low-tech firms. For high-tech firms, this relation is not statistically significant. One possible explanation is that high-tech firms have to innovate continuously to survive in the long run. The competitive pressure to innovate or perish dissipates the negative effect of managerial entrenchment on firm innovation. Overall, our results support the agency based explanation of the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance in innovation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)30-43
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economics and Business
Volume72
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2014

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • General Business,Management and Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Citations
  • Corporate governance
  • Entrenchment
  • Patents
  • R&D

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