Abstract
This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1983-2012 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Accounting and Finance |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2023 |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Keywords
- information asymmetry
- managerial ability
- managerial efficiency
- non-GAAP earnings
- voluntary disclosure
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