Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1983-2012
Number of pages30
JournalAccounting and Finance
Volume63
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2023

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Keywords

  • information asymmetry
  • managerial ability
  • managerial efficiency
  • non-GAAP earnings
  • voluntary disclosure

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this