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Embarrassment and political repair

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This chapter explores the role of embarrassment in addressing political injustices and mass atrocities. I argue that embarrassment - the fear of appearing inconsistent or ridiculous - can motivate political change in unexpected ways, turning seemingly idealistic reformist commitments into practical programs for redressing past wrongs. In the first section of the chapter, I distinguish embarrassment from shame and shaming. The second section takes up embarrassment as a political virtue. The third section considers the practice of embarrassing others, and the fourth discusses some possible challenges to my own account. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SHAME AND EMBARRASSMENT Shame arises when others, whose opinions we care about, have perceived us committing a culpable act. Unlike guilt, which is primarily a private disposition, shame typically requires an audience. The degree to which it is felt depends on how wrong the act was, how public it was, and the significance of the audience. Shame can and often does attach to the very character of the agent feeling it, unlike guilt, which is usually more restricted to feelings about a particular deed. Shame, in other words, more than guilt, has a tendency to “infect” the culpable agent in his or her own estimation - when one is ashamed, one feels that one is bad rather than simply feeling that one has done something wrong. The classic philosophical account of shame is provided by Aristotle: the feeling is labeled aidos in the Nichomachean Ethics and aischyne in the Rhetoric. Aristotle sees shame as a quasi-virtue that alerts us to the possibility of reputation damage in what we are about to do in the future (aidos) or, more broadly, in what we have done or are doing at present (aischyne). A morally virtuous person would not usually feel shame, as he or she would be able to navigate away from the circumstances that give rise to it. Shame, for Aristotle, is a disposition typical of the young. Fully developed moral agents can capably sidestep shameful activities.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEmotions and Mass Atrocity
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophical and Theoretical Explorations
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages262-276
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781316563281
ISBN (Print)9781107127739
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • General Social Sciences

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