Abstract
I study a dynamic moral hazard model with endogenous risk taking, in which exposing the firm to greater risks could align the manager's private benefit with that of the owner and thus enhance the incentive provision.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 112-115 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 157 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 2017 |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Dynamic contract
- Endogenous risk taking
- Moral hazard
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