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Paying less as a signal of competence

  • University of New England
  • University of North Dakota
  • University of New Hampshire
  • University of Minnesota Twin Cities

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Past research suggests that cost-saving behaviors such as couponing can trigger negative trait perceptions (e.g. that the consumer is being miserly), and consumers purchasing gifts may avoid use of coupons so as not to appear ungenerous. In contrast, we contend that cost-saving can also send a positive signal. In five studies we show that cost-saving enhances perceptions of consumer competence and financial management skills, which, in turn, can lead to more favorable brand perceptions. Using costly signaling theory, we further identify two boundary conditions for these signals to be perceived as genuine: (a) absence of ulterior motives (e.g., sponsored social media posts that diminish the authenticity of the signal) and (b) the presence of the quality being signaled (as higher-class consumers are typically seen as competent). Our findings extend the scope of signaling theory to consumer behavior contexts, showing that costly signals must honestly convey positive qualities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)113-126
Number of pages14
JournalPsychology and Marketing
Volume42
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2025
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Marketing

Keywords

  • costly signaling
  • couponing
  • deals
  • socioeconomic status
  • stereotype content model

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