Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Rui Li

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Rui Li

Accounting & Finance

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	322-326
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	108
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005
State	Published - Sep 2010

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Folk theorem
Private monitoring
Repeated games

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10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

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title = "Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring",

keywords = "Folk theorem, Private monitoring, Repeated games",

author = "Rui Li",

year = "2010",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005",

language = "English",

volume = "108",

pages = "322--326",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

AU - Li, Rui

PY - 2010/9

Y1 - 2010/9

KW - Folk theorem

KW - Private monitoring

KW - Repeated games

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UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/77955612427#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77955612427

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VL - 108

SP - 322

EP - 326

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

Keywords

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