Abstract
This paper examines the duration of commercial bank debt reschedulings for sovereigns. We show that the length of the first part of the rescheduling process, in which major creditor banks and the debtor country participate, is significantly affected by only the scale of rescheduling. However, the length of the second part of the process, where all the creditor banks in the syndicate are involved, is significantly affected by maturity, debt/GNP, debt/exports, GNP growth during the renegotiation process, and the presence of exit bonds and early participation fees. We also find that the time elapsed significantly increases the instantaneous probability of completion of the first part of the process.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 673-685 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Banking and Finance |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 1996 |
ASJC Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Duration models
- Rescheduling
- Sovereign debt
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